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Abstract 
The paper discusses recent trends in the sister sciences of evolutionary economics and 
complexity economics.  It suggests that a unifying approach that marries the two strands is 
needed when reconstructing economics as a science capable of tackling the two key questions of 
the discipline: complex economic structure and evolutionary economic change.  Physics, biology 
and the cultural sciences are investigated in terms of their usefulness as both paradigmatic 
orientation and as toolbox.  The micro–meso–macro architecture delineated puts meso centre 
stage, highlighting its significance as structure component and as process component alike, 
thereby allowing us to handle the key issues of structure and change. 
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1  The rise of evolutionary economics 
The last three decades have seen an upsurge in the number of publications addressing themes 
that have come to be grouped under the heading of ‘evolutionary economics’.  In a recent 
bibliometric account comprising the abstracts of articles published in all economic journals over 
the past half-century, Sandra Silva and Aurora Teixeira have been documenting the impressive 
magnitudes and structural dynamic of this trend – a trend that has accelerated tremendously in 
the last two decades, considering that 90 per cent of this body of research is recorded as having 
been published since 1990 (Silva and Teixeira 2009; EconLit database).  There have been related 
accounts, emphasising the interpretation and assessment of these trends, that have not shied 
away from a discourse about the general applicability and adequacy of the term ‘evolutionary’ 
itself (Hodgson 1993; Witt 2008; Dolfsma and Leydesdorff 2010). 
In its paradigmatic outlook, the essential difference of evolutionary economics from the 
neoclassical mainstream is that it gives priority to dynamic rather than static analysis, and, more 
specifically, puts behavioural, institutional, technological and other explanatory variables (rather 
than treating them exogenously) centre stage when coping with the former.  It was a great 
moment for the science of economics, and for evolutionary economics in particular, when An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change was published, in 1982, by Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter.  In their trailblazing contribution, they set out two perspectives: a general one, addressing 
foundational issues, and a particular one, relating to the construction of specific theoretical 
models.  Addressing the former, they state (Nelson and Winter 1982: 4) that 
 
a major reconstruction of the theoretical foundations of our discipline is a 
precondition for significant growth in our understanding of economic change. 
 
They acknowledge (399) that they are ‘developing a general way of theorizing about 
economic change’.  In turn, their particular endeavour (399) is ‘with exploring particular models 
and arguments, consistent with that approach, focusing on particular features or issues about 
economic change’.  When assessing the two, they state (399), significantly, 
 
Of the two parts of the endeavor, we view the development of the general theoretical 
approach as by far the more important.  The particular models are interesting in their 
own right, but we regard them primarily as examples of the class of models 
consistent with our proposed way of theorizing. 
 
The significance of their book lies in the fact that it succeeds in providing an alternative to 
neoclassical economics by furnishing essential cues for a new ‘way of theorizing’. 
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2  Evolutionary economics in the future 
When assessing developments in the field since the publication of this book, two trends warrant 
particular attention.  First, there has been a considerable falling short in the ensuing efforts to 
attain the two goals.  Most of the above-mentioned major publications (Silva and Teixeira 2009), 
worthy though they are, have concentrated on devising and refining particular models and 
theoretical positions, with much less effort being devoted to the goal of constructing viable 
foundations for the approach.  The lack of underpinning has not just left much valuable work 
unstructured and unrelated, it has also rendered the new discipline as a whole generally weak in 
terms of its competition with the mainstream. 
Second, there has been a growing recognition that the search for better foundations should 
be informed by integration rather than isolated developments along author-focused approaches, 
based, for instance, on the works of Joseph Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich Hayek or 
Alfred Marshall.  This applies even to Schumpeter’s work, which has probably contributed more 
to the foundations of the new approach than that of any other author (Hanusch and Pyka 2007).  
Marking the boundaries of a modern Schumpeter programme, Andreas Pyka and Horst Hanusch 
(2006: 4) note that 
 
that strand of literature which is concerned with industry evolution and technological 
progress…can be coined Neo-Schumpeterian economics. 
 
Since Nelson and Winter’s work bears strong imprints of Schumpeter’s thinking, what Nelson 
and co-author Davide Consoli have said recently when addressing the overall scope of the 
discipline is particularly noteworthy (Nelson and Consoli 2010: 665): 
 
Many contemporary economists who consider themselves evolutionary theorists 
have in mind a narrower and a broader goal.  The narrower goal is to meet what we 
will call ‘Schumpeter’s challenge,’ which is to create a theoretical framework capable 
of analyzing innovation-driven economic growth.  While it might be suggested that 
this narrow goal is rather broad, the still broader goal is no less than the replacement 
of neoclassical theory with a theoretical alternative… 
 
Schumpeter’s approach, which originally represented the general reference point, is now 
seen as a narrow approach bearing in mind the new, broader vision of the discipline.  Esben 
Andersen’s (2008: 1) general assessment may mirror a view held widely in this school of thought: 
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[E]volutionary economics has moved beyond Schumpeter’s strand … and has also 
moved beyond Marshall and Veblen and many other pioneers. 
 
Although the extended scope has not yet coalesced into a solid, unified theoretical framework, it 
has already been providing, as will be shown, enormously fertile ground for developing, testing 
and experimenting with new theoretical approaches, simulation techniques, statistical methods, 
ways of organising and collecting data and mathematical representations. 
 
3  The recurrence of complexity 
Developments in the field of evolutionary economics have been paralleled by research activities 
and publications that have come to be grouped together under the label of ‘complexity science’ 
or ‘complexity economics’.  Complexity economics is the offspring of a scientific movement that 
has its roots in a variety of disciplines, such as physics, biology, neurology, psychology, linguistics 
and economics.  Its origins may be traced back to the establishment of the ‘Society for General 
Systems Research’ in the 1950s, the founders of which included the mathematician and musician 
Anatol Rapoport (Rapoport and Horvath 1959), the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) and 
the economist Kenneth Boulding (1956).  More recently, the approach received particular 
attention because of the work done by scholars (often with a physics background) at the Santa Fe 
Institute (Anderson, Arrow and Pines 1988; Arthur, Durlauf and Lane 1997).  The complexity 
approach has extended into various specialised strands, branching most recently into 
econophysics and econobiology.  The generality of the approach has invoked the broad vision of 
a ‘transdisciplinary perspective’ (Rosser 2010). 
Over half a century ago Rapoport and Horvath noted in a survey article that members of 
the camp ‘proclaim the dawn of [a] new era as being ushered in by a preoccupation with 
“organized complexity”, the region between the extremes of “organized simplicity” and “chaotic 
complexity”, with which the exact scientist has been hitherto exclusively concerned’ (Rapoport 
and Horvath 1959: 100).  In our time, Colander, Holt and Rosser (2010: 1) have evoked a vision 
of the role of complexity in economics quite akin to that of the founding fathers, contending that 
 
[t]he neoclassical era in economics has ended and is being replaced by a new era.  
What best characterizes the new era is its acceptance that the economy is complex, 
and thus that it might be called the complexity era. 
 
4  De pluribus unum  
There is a close kinship between evolutionary and complexity approaches, which share variously 
analytical concepts, theoretical terms and methods (Foster 2004; Foster and Hölzl 2004).  In fact, 
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the affinity is so close that we can often observe a similarity in the general perception of the 
subject matter.  Silva and Teixeira (2009: 605), for instance, define 
 
[e]volutionary economics … as a hybrid framework of evolutionary theory, complex 
systems theory, self-organization theory and agent-based computational theory. 
 
Clearly, ‘complex systems theory’ and ‘self-organisation theory’, as well as ‘agent-based 
computational theory’, hold equally prominent places in whatever may be defined as the research 
agenda of complexity economics.  In turn, conceptual, analytical and theoretical notions routinely 
employed in works of complexity economics, such as heterogeneous agents, bounded rationality, 
fitness landscapes, selection and replication, are, again, part and parcel of the scientific 
programme of evolutionary economics. 
The close kinship is easy to understand if we recognise that both approaches share the 
basic tenet that knowledge is the key to understanding economic phenomena.  The proponents 
of both schools of thought deal with the structural and evolutionary complexity of knowledge of 
the economy.  Why, then, are there two approaches?  Essentially, they are distinct because they 
entertain different perspectives when addressing major problem areas: evolutionary economics 
featuring traditionally the continuity of novelty-driven evolutionary change, and complexity 
economics putting centre stage the structure-focused systemic aspects of the knowledge-based 
economy.  Nonetheless, irrespective of the extant differences in analytic focus, they represent 
only two variations of a common and recurrent theme: the evolving complexity of knowledge as 
it relates to economic operations.  The study of knowledge, to paraphrase Marshall, is the Mecca 
of economists, and the twin strands of evolutionary economics and complexity economics are the 
two main roads heading towards this destination. 
 
5  Natural history: hierarchy of evolved complexity 
From a global perspective, the question is this: what makes specifically economic entities 
distinctively different from non-economic ones?  Economic entities are part of a natural history 
that has evolved into a hierarchy of levels with differing complexity.  Although complexity 
scientists have variously addressed the issue of how to define and validate the hierarchy of 
evolved complexity (Holland 1998; Lane 2006), few contributions have been forthcoming so far 
from the camp of economists, with the notable exception of John Foster (2005). 
Construed in elementary terms, the natural hierarchy can be seen as being composed of 
three levels: the physical (or physiochemical), the biological and the cultural.  Significantly, 
economic entities are phenomena that, in their evolved complexity, belong to the cultural – not 
to the physical, biological or any other – level of complexity.  To claim empirical validity, 
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economic entities need to be portrayed in such a way that they take into account the 
characteristics of the level of complexity to which they belong.  Seen in this way, economics is, in 
a very fundamental sense, a cultural science. 
 
6  Instrumental adequacy versus empirical validity 
Scientific statements stand out over non-scientific ones in their logical rigour, formal elegance 
and openness to falsification.  In order to qualify for scientific status, a particular ‘toolbox’ is 
required, such as analytical language, various forms of logic and mathematical paradigms, 
statistical methods or modelling techniques.  Just as a hammer, screwdriver or saw can be used 
for different purposes, so a tool from the scientific toolbox can be employed for the analysis of 
phenomena of different levels of complexity in the evolved hierarchy.  Nevertheless, although 
tools can be applied for the analysis of many phenomena of different kinds, they cannot be 
applied for the analysis of all phenomena of all kinds: scissors can be used for operating on paper 
or a similar material, for example, but they will be of no help at all in polishing a diamond.  As 
you might expect, the tools have to be adjusted to suit the nature of the reality they deal with. 
This may sound quite self-evident, but we often encounter situations in which highly 
sophisticated tools that have been developed in the natural sciences, such as mathematical 
models, statistical methods, conceptual frames or modelling techniques, are, in effect, ready and 
waiting to be used by economists as well.  From a scientific standpoint, it is mandatory to employ 
the most sophisticated tools available.  To apply this postulate to the fullest, it is not the tools but 
the perception of reality that may have to be adjusted accordingly.  Uncomfortable though it may 
be to accept this point, it is certainly not unheard of for economists (like other scientists) to find 
themselves in effect endorsing Georg Hegel’s dictum that, if the facts are a certain way, then so 
much the worse for them.  There is, therefore, a trade-off between scientific rigour, consistency 
and mathematical elegance on the one hand and the empirical content and possible practical 
relevance of a scientific theory on the other. 
As indicated earlier, there has been an enormous scientific dynamic in the two camps – a 
dynamic whose acceleration in the past 10 to 20 years has been chiefly tool-led, propelled either 
by enhancements to existing mathematical representations and modelling techniques or the 
introduction of novel ones.  This dynamic is to a large extent attributable to developments in 
related disciplines, which typically deal with phenomena of an order of complexity significantly 
lower than those dealt with in economics.  Drawing on these sources, complexity economics has 
turned mainly to strands of modern physics, such as multi-particle physics, synergy or dissipative 
structures, while evolutionary economics has had resort to advances in the toolbox of biology, 
turning to formal-analytical concepts of Darwinian evolution, theorems of selection, replicator 
dynamics, population models, and so forth.  Various references that are quoted subsequently 
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provide ample evidence of advances in the areas of analytical conceptualisation, mathematical 
exposition, methods of data measurement and analysis, and simulation techniques.  It is 
important to point these developments out, as not only do they signify genuine scientific progress, 
they also provide a weapon with which to counter the repeated assertions of supremacy in this 
regard by mainstream economists.  Unlike most earlier heterodox approaches, evolutionary and 
complexity economics defy the neoclassical mainstream at the instrumental plane. 
The new heterodoxy does more than just compete at the plane of formal-analytical 
exposition, however; it also challenges the neoclassical orthodoxy by claiming to be superior in 
representing economic reality.  This assertion is by no means marginal, since the claim to deal 
adequately with the phenomena of complexity and of evolutionary change lies at the very 
ontological core of the perception of economic reality.  Given the fundamental significance of 
this claim, then, the issue at hand – whether or not the physical and the biological levels are 
sufficient to serve as benchmarks for theorising or modelling in economics – is of the utmost 
relevance. 
 
7  Philosophy of ‘als ob’ 
The formulation of a scientific theory, T, may be viewed in general as an inductive effort to 
capture a particular reality, R, and the ensuing application of T as a deductive inference to obtain 
statements about a class of singular instances comprised in R.  In the standard case, induction 
(Ri) and deduction (Rd) apply to the same reality, R.  In this way, for instance, economic theory 
(Te) always revolves empirically around economic reality: Re, Rei = Red. 
The particular feature of a physics- or biology-based economic theory is that the general 
premise of symmetry regarding the empirical perception is dropped: Rei ≠ Red.  The reality that 
informs the formulation of economic theory is extended to include characteristics of reality that 
are typically non-economic ones: Rα.  Rei is substituted by Rαi, where α = p, b, with p and b 
denoting the reality actualised at the physical level and at the biological level, respectively.  The 
conjecture is entertained ‘as if’ non-economic reality represented a valid inductive base for 
economic theory or model construction: Rei ≈ Rαi.  The method of the ‘as if’ was introduced by 
Hans Vaihinger in his Philosophie des Als Ob (Philosophy of the As If ) a century ago, and little of this 
formal exposition and mathematical representation would survive today without recognition of 
his seminal work (Vaihinger 1911; Zimmermann 2009).  While the employment of the ‘as if’ 
method fosters scientific advance at the formal-expositional level, the procedure also incurs a 
cost in terms of what can be called the critical empirical distance (CED): the distance between the 
perception of reality that furnishes the empirical material for the construction of the theory and 
the reality that the theory is actually designed for.  Any economic theory or model claiming 
empirical relevance requires the ‘as if’ to be vindicated with a view to the CED employed. 
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This opens up a wide field, and, in an attempt to cut what appears to be something of a 
Gordian knot, two major kinds of justification can be distinguished.  Given the hierarchy of 
different complexity levels, reductionism means that the nature of the complexity of economic 
particles can be explained validly in terms of the nature of physical ones.  Economic phenomena 
are explained in terms of biological laws, which, then, are explained again in terms of physical 
laws, espousing the view that knowing the physical laws is a necessary condition (weak 
reductionism) – or, more radically, a sufficient condition (strong reductionism) – for dealing with 
complexity in economics.  A vindication of the CED by reductionism is premised on an outdated 
ontology (see the next section), and, in consideration of this fundamental flaw, it is ill-fitted to 
serve the task envisaged for it. 
Besides these wholesale approaches to reductionism, there is a related, second, kind of 
justification of the CED.  As closer scrutiny reveals, it is of a quite different nature, however.  
This justification is based on the premise that economic phenomena are emergent properties of 
levels of lower complexity, and that ‘traces’ of earlier, simpler forms of complexity are manifest in 
economic phenomena.  The analysis proceeds by singling out certain economic phenomena or 
aspects of economic reality that display an order of simple complexity.  By so doing, it retains the 
premise that economic reality in its entirety is much more complex than what constitutes the 
subject matter of a particular analysis.  These models intend to reduce a complicated problem to 
a simpler one, but for that they cannot be dismissed flatly as being purely reductionist. 
 
8  Physics as traditional Mecca: neoclassical economics and econophysics 
Turning to the level of complexity assumed to prevail at the physical level, it is conjectured ‘as if’ 
the complexity of physical particles corresponds to that of economic particles.  Atoms, molecules 
and equivalent physical particles display a kind of complexity that can be identified in economic 
systems, employing the inductive base Rpi ≈ Rei. 
This may lead us to assume that modern econophysics and complexity approaches share 
with neoclassical economics common roots in physics.  Although this is certainly true as far as 
their common level of abstraction is concerned, there is a fundamental difference in the kind of 
interpretation as to what these roots actually mean.  For the purposes of the present study, the 
distinction between an old and a new canon of physics (of p in R) may render useful service. 
The old – or, in familiar parlance, ‘mechanistic’ – canon can be seen to embrace Newtonian 
physics, classical (Ludwig Boltzmann’s) thermodynamics and Albert Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity.  The old canon operates on a uniform perception of matter and energy and invariant 
laws.  The distinction is not between the whole of an ensemble and its individual particles but, 
rather, between large and small quantities measured with the metrics of mass on the scale of a 
space–time continuum. 
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Two major hallmarks of the mechanistic model may be identified.  The first resides in the 
proposition that the particles separate rather than associate, producing relations between them.  
No structure ever exists in the model unless imposed by outside factors.  An economy is 
composed of many economic agents whose behaviour is governed by the law of rational 
decision-making and a set of commodities that – in application of the law – are reallocated 
according to particular changes in the exogenous conditions, such as preferences or technical 
opportunities.  A statement about the nature of the economy may be obtained by a superposition 
of the decision-making trajectories of the agents or by an aggregation of the indexed individual 
commodity bundles.  Aggregation may take various forms depending on the theoretical purpose 
being pursued; for instance, microeconomics proceeds by aggregating individual or partial market 
equilibria into a ‘general’ market equilibrium, macroeconomics by aggregating the outcomes of 
individual decisions that pertain to macro variables, such as investment, saving, consumption and 
employment, discussing an economy’s total income in a schema of relationships between sub-
aggregates.  The method of (dis-)aggregation can be used as a tool in any fashion, but, however it 
is used, it will never yield any endogenous explanation of economic structure or change. 
The second proposition holds that the uniform cognitive or behavioural disposition (or 
propensity) of agents is given as a fixed datum.  Methodologically, this means that we dispose of 
a law that, knowing the initial conditions, allows us to calculate precisely the kind of decision 
trajectory and resultant reallocation in the commodity space.  The determinism of the model, in 
suggesting that we can predict precisely the future and ‘retrodict’ precisely the past, has been 
rightly criticised, and stochastic models have been proposed to remedy the deficiency.  The 
problem is not with the degree of precision in determinism, however, but, rather, with the 
fundamental observation that real phenomena at all levels of complexity do change over time. 
Seizing upon this, the central premise of time symmetry collapses.  The recognition of time 
asymmetry – that is, historical time – in the basic set-up of theory construction has profound 
implications for major methodological issues, most significantly for theory validation.  In the 
nomological case a theory counts as being valid if it allows us to calculate a path precisely, 
provided that relevant information about the initial conditions is furnished.  In the non-
nomological case this is different: neither the propounded law nor the kind of conditions to 
which it applies repeat universally over time. 
How, then, can we test or falsify a theory or model under the assumption of universal non-
repeatability?  Complexity economics and evolutionary economics deal, essentially, with models 
that operate under the aegis of this very assumption.  It may be taken as an indication of the 
difficulties of dealing with this methodological problem if we recognise that we do not even have 
a term equivalent to that of ‘nomological’ (a bridgehead of positivism).  One suggestion is to call 
it ‘histonomic’, whereby ‘nomic’ carries the meaning of ‘generalised’ or ‘law-like’, and ‘histo(r)’ 
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may be seen as expressing the historicity of real phenomena (for further discussion, see Dopfer 
1986).  Major concepts employed in the two camps, such as emergence, evolutionary dynamics, 
path dependence and structural change, are premised on the recognition of the general historicity 
of economic phenomena – thus calling for histonomic analysis. 
 
9  The new (post-neoclassical) physics-based economics 
Modern physics-based economics, such as that from the Santa Fe Institute, is premised on the 
concept of many heterogeneous economic agents that interact.  A primary concept is feedback, 
which typically (though not necessarily) operates across different scales.  The technical hallmark 
is non-linearity, which stands in contrast to the equilibrium statics and linear dynamics of the 
received doctrine.  Based on complex non-linear dynamics, the ensemble as a whole displays 
emergent properties.  The physics toolbox has been utilised to describe various kinds of 
economic phenomena.  For instance, the concept of synergy, developed in laser physics, has been 
applied to model the emergence of collective preferences, fashion patterns and self-organisation 
in firms and markets (Weise 1998; Weidlich 2000; Haken 2005).  Similarly, methods and 
techniques have been borrowed from multi-particle physics to model the behaviour of markets, 
particularly in the financial sector (Schweizer 2003; Lux and Kaizoji 2007).  Other borrowings 
from physics relate to the analysis of complex regularities of socio-economic networks and 
collectives (Hollingsworth and Müller 2008; Sornette 2008), to percolation theory for modelling 
spatial dynamics (Brenner 2004) or to models of diffusion of technology under conditions of 
various consumer demand characteristics (Silverberg and Verspagen 2005a).  These approaches 
usually apply physics to a somewhat narrow domain, such as preference formation or financial 
markets, leaving largely unaddressed the issue of how to deal with the complexity of the economy 
as a whole. 
The physics-based models generally display high mathematical abstraction, precision and 
consistency.  To achieve this they use methods that were developed to represent phenomena the 
complexity of which is lower than that for economic ones, as has been mentioned.  The tools 
adopted work within a range of empirical assumptions, and importing these tools into economics 
necessarily means accepting their particular array of assumptions.  Accordingly, the need arises to 
explain what exactly justifies treating physical particles as if they were economic particles with 
low complexity – that is, Rpi ≈ Rei – and how these then relate to others in the entirety of an 
economic unit that typically displays features of high complexity.  Models of a physico-
mathematical nature are premised on the greatest empirical distance, that between dead matter 
and economic life, thereby rendering evident the need to justify their empirical content.  The 
methodological crux is this: the empirical distance is great, making the problem large; and, simply 
because it is large, solutions with regard to vindicating it become difficult.  The size of the 
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problem, paralleled by the ensuing difficulty in solving it, may well represent major limitations on 
the development of physics-based economics into an empirically attractive variant. 
 
10  The biological connection 
Biology-based economic models operate with a conjecture analogous to the physics-based ones: 
that the analytical concepts, modelling techniques and mathematical representations used in 
biology represent a kind or level of complexity that can portray that of certain economic 
phenomena, or of certain aspects of economic reality: Rbi ≈ Rei. 
The proximity of biology and economics (both deal with living systems) has inspired 
economists in two fundamental ways.  First of all, biology has served as paradigmatic orientation 
in a world ruled by mechanics.  The founding fathers of the discipline, particularly Veblen and 
Marshall, entertained the vision of economics as a science drawing deep inspiration from biology 
(Marshall 1890; Veblen 1898).  These two great precursors held quite different views about how 
economics should be reconstructed, but they were united in what they were against: the 
mechanics of neoclassical economics. 
Biology may provide paradigmatic guidance for economics in terms of both its static 
problems and its dynamic problems.  Concerning economic statics (defined as the logic of 
coordination), biology provides a paradigmatic pillar in the form of the living system approach, as, 
for instance, universalised into ‘general system theory’ (GST: see section 12 below) by Bertalanffy 
(1968).  The historical dynamic of that system, as its second pillar, is captured by the concepts of 
ontogeny and phylogeny (see section 13). 
There is a common denominator that unifies all concepts: biological knowledge – say G.  
In a state of ontogeny, an organism performs life-maintaining operations on the basis of a given 
G.  In phylogeny, G changes over time.  Gottfried Leibniz, an early discoverer of evolution, 
spoke – dissenting from Isaac Newton’s continuity of equilibrium – of a ‘continuity of change’ 
(Leibniz 1714 [1991]), calling it the ‘continuity principle’ (Öser 1974; see also Witt 2004). 
Meagre as it is, the discussion allows us to take a first step towards delineating a general 
analytical framework for economic theory.  The prefix ‘biological’ in knowledge can, like a 
constant in mathematics, be readily dropped, and then we get a universal concept of knowledge 
and of operation.  Applied to economics, this means that we have two major levels of theoretical 
analysis: 
 
operational level ongoing operations based on given knowledge 
knowledge level structure and evolution of knowledge governing operations 
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Evolutionary economics deals with the structure and evolution of knowledge for economic 
operations.  Neoclassical economics analyses ongoing economic operations under the assumption 
of given knowledge. 
The second way in which biology has proved inspiring is that it deserves its reputation as 
the ‘Mecca of the economist’ for practical reasons.  It is useful as more than just a paradigmatic 
signpost; as has been mentioned, it provides a toolbox incorporating modelling techniques, 
mathematical representations and statistical procedures.  Applying this toolbox, a range of 
conceptual, theoretical and simulation models have been devised, including genetic algorithm and 
genetic computing (Alander 2009), game-theoretic models and replicator dynamics (Gintis 2009), 
evolutionary growth and percolation models (Silverberg and Verspagen 2005b; Kwasnicka and 
Kwasnicki 2006) and fitness landscape models (Frenken 2006).  These models shed light on the 
richness of life in economics in a mathematical form borrowed from biology. 
The issue, again, is whether the mathematical representations adequately portray the 
complexity that is characteristic of economic phenomena.  The complexity of life is closer to that 
of economic phenomena than dead matter, but there is still an empirical distance – Rbi ≈ Rei – to 
be justified (Foray and Steinmueller 2001; Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta 2007; Geisendorf 2007).  
For instance, genetic algorithm and genetic computing models posit knowledge in terms of 
algorithms, prompting questions about the extent to which a completely determined technical 
sequence can capture evolution; Stuart Kaufmann’s ‘NK fitness landscapes’ depict biological 
environments, inviting questions as to whether or in what way these portray characteristics of 
economic landscapes with complementary-defined structures anchored in the division of labour 
and knowledge; and replicator models dealing with genetic knowledge transmission call for 
clarification as to whether or how empirically meaningful economic knowledge transmission is 
without considering the behavioural key concept of adoption upon which all communication is 
premised. 
 
11  Biological archetypes 
It is certainly an extraordinary challenge for an economist to deal with the essentials of biology, 
but the proposition of making it the Mecca of economists calls precisely for this.  Rising to this 
challenge, major elementary biological terms are introduced first, and then they are discussed 
with a view to their relevance for economics. 
Given the enormous quantity and different meanings of the theoretical terms applied in 
modern biology, it would seem necessary to find a way into the problem that has the virtue of 
some degree of familiarity.  Looking for a course that is intuitively appealing, yet not grossly at 
odds with the major findings of modern biology, the archetype of a history of life is what is 
portrayed. 
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Taking dissipative structure (Prigogine 2005) – which applies to both the physical and the 
biological levels – as a point of departure, life may be seen to emerge with the capability of that 
structure to generate a twin configuration within one ensemble of particles.  This primitive 
creature indeed emerged as a double membrane, and so, it may be further conjectured, its 
division led to the important characteristic of replication for the first time.  This process was then 
repeated, and thus information came to be preserved over time. 
Replication can be subject to error, however, and in this way change occurs in the 
molecular structures.  There is repeatability, as in the nomological model, but – unlike that model 
– it takes place only within a limited historical time range.  On a global scale there is a continuity 
of change.  Thus we have an evolutionary trajectory defined by the dynamic of 
 
novelty      replication      retention 
 
How do physical ensembles differ from biological ones?  At the physical level, particles 
have a propensity to associate and to change, and in this way they form structure and evolve.  
These remarkable, non-classical, properties are attained on the basis of the invariant behavioural 
propensities of the individual particles.  Given a particular thermodynamic environment, self-
organisation, phase transitions and bifurcations occur in the ensemble spontaneously.  Despite 
the ensemble’s remarkable properties, though, the individual particles themselves are passive and 
reactive: they respond only to external conditions.  The case is entirely different with a biological 
ensemble: each of the particles is active in generating and processing information.  Order and 
change comes, paraphrasing Schumpeter, ‘from within’ the particles of the ensemble.  Activities 
in the ensemble still depend on external conditions, but there is – beyond a behavioural law – an 
internal incidence of order and of change.  In a biological ensemble, unlike a physical one, the 
particles exercise autonomy, at a very fundamental level. 
The new properties of the biological ensemble give information an entirely new meaning: 
the particles of the ensemble are informationally open.  Unlike physical particles, biological 
particles can exchange information.  This attribute has two major consequences.  On the one 
hand, information has to be acknowledged in its semantic property.  It cannot be reduced to a 
physico-thermodynamic parameter, but needs to be stated in terms of its qualitative content.  On 
the other hand, given the ability of the particles to code (to encode and to decode), 
communication becomes relevant.  In a physical model there is no communication between 
particles at the level of information, as there is no semantic information in the first place (Eigen 
and Schuster 1979; Küppers 2000). 
It should be clear from this archetypical exposition that it makes a major difference 
whether an economic model is physics-based or biology-based.  The familiar concept of multi-
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agent models may be given an entirely different theoretical meaning depending on how we devise 
the conceptual framework and how we define the properties of the particles.  In their outward 
appearance they resemble each other, like eggs, since they all start with the assumption of 
heterogeneous agents.  The touchstone is the kind of distinction made between carrier and 
information, however, and the particular meanings given to them.  In particle-physics-based 
multi-agent models, the information carried by the particles collapses to a ‘dummy’ variable.  
There is no theoretical explication of the complex process underlying the individual information 
trajectory or of the communication between the particles.  Multi-agent models that have moved 
away from their physics origins have introduced the distinction between carrier and information, 
however, and have elaborated on the distinct properties of each. 
In an analogous vein, the semantic content of information may be addressed differently 
from a theoretical point of view.  As we have seen, although semantics drops out in econophysics 
it is retained in biology-based models.  For instance, genetic algorithm models and genetic 
computing put ‘genetic’ information centre stage, thus rectifying the aforementioned deficit.  
While it is exactly this property that allows for their mathematical representation, it also calls for a 
vindication of the CED in terms of evidence for a class of decision-making procedures that 
follow a completely determined sequence of decision-making steps. 
 
12  Biological Mecca I: link to general system theory 
There is an important implication that follows from the concept of replication errors: the 
emergence of heterogeneity.  Replication errors occur randomly.  Qualitatively different 
information is generated in this way, which, as a consequence, may well be ready for a new use. 
Starting again with the propensity to associate, the particles generally have the capability for 
associating in terms of relations defined by their qualitative attributes.  The particles are defined 
not only by their physical characteristics but also by the particular tasks or functions they can 
accomplish in an ensemble.  In this way they are complementary – that is, heterogeneous 
information A is complementary to heterogeneous information B, and that to C, and so forth, 
forming a whole defined by a set of particles and their complementarities.  The concept of 
complementariness is absolutely essential for grasping the meaning of what constitutes a system. 
In biology, the systemic focus is on organisms – generalised by Bertalanffy into the concept 
of general system theory (see section 10 above).  The concept of an organism or a living system 
immediately suggests a homology to the firm and the economy, and, indeed, biology-based self-
organisation and open living system models have been proposed both in the management 
sciences (Ulrich and Probst 1984; Schwaninger 2010) and in economics, often in direct 
application to ecological issues (Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Kapp 1976; Ayres 1994; Maréchal 
2007). 
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The pivotal question for economics is this: can the concept of biological system be useful, 
for instance in its GST variant, for representing the economy as a whole?  Can the characteristics 
of an organism be transposed onto the macro level?  There are early attempts by the German 
historical school and its predecessors to construct the economy as organism (Hutter 1994; 
Hodgson 2000).  Along a quite different line, Roy Weintraub has interpreted general equilibrium 
theory in terms of a system of simultaneous equations proposed by Bertalanffy for representing 
relations among component parts of a living system (Weintraub 1974).  This conjecture is 
particularly useful in that it allows us to highlight the limitations of the orthodox master model.  
A Walrasian or analogous simultaneous equation system posits the allocation of all commodities 
under equilibrium conditions.  The essential point is that there are no complementarities between 
the commodities.  All the qualitative attributes required for stating them have been eliminated 
(see section 17).  To construct a model with complementarities requires the assignment of 
qualitative attributes to some variables of the model.  This can be accomplished by introducing 
quality into the extant endogenous variables (basically, product characteristics and heterogeneous 
agents) and/or by importing into the model extant exogenous variables, such as preferences and 
technology, preserving their qualitative status.  Although considerable efforts have been made 
with a view to relaxing the received assumptions, such as when operating (even in mainstream 
models) with the assumption of heterogeneous agents, a systemic approach – certainly anything 
along the line of Bertalanffy’s GST – allowing for functions, distributed tasks or equivalent 
qualitative attributes is not yet available. 
 
13  Mecca II: evolutionary biology 
Turning to evolutionary – such as Darwinian – biology, the question is whether this branch of 
the discipline can contribute anything to the representation of structure in economics.  
Evolutionary biology is concerned with phylogeny.  The forces of variation and selection produce 
a highly structured environment populated by many organisms and species of various kinds.  The 
living beings are embedded in a highly complex web of interdependencies, realised, for instance, 
as hunter–prey or symbiotic relationships.  There is nothing of the kind of complementarities 
that are characteristic of an economy in the overall system of ‘Mother Nature’, however.  There 
are highly complex interdependencies but these do not represent complementarities.  As Adam 
Smith aptly remarked, nobody has ever seen dogs exchanging bones – but, there again, neither 
has anybody seen dogs cooperate with members of other species to achieve a common output.  
It is precisely this kind of cooperation on the basis of distributed differential tasks that is 
characteristic of an economy but is non-existent in nature.  Putting the two into a single pot 
would mean committing the fallacy of a major misplaced homology.  Interpreting an economy 
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through the lenses of evolutionary biology could thus lead to a fundamental misinterpretation of 
its systemic nature and the particular character of its evolutionary dynamic. 
Two major positions developed in evolutionary biology have been of relevance for 
economics.  Jean-Baptiste Lamarck saw evolutionary change as a process in which organisms’ 
adaptations are inherited.  In biology this hypothesis has not been corroborated by empirical 
evidence, in view of the absence of a mechanism that would transpose information from the 
cortical level to that of sexual reproduction, but it represents a good approximation to what 
happens in firms or how agents behave.  They adapt to their environment by learning.  When 
highlighting this process in the firm, Nelson and Winter have, quite appropriately, interpreted 
their analysis as being ‘unabashedly Lamarckian’ (1982: 11).  Significantly, Lamarck’s theory leads 
to the general inference that information is adopted (not simply replicated) – a concept with little 
meaning in modern biology but central to the analysis of phenomena at the cultural level, where 
economics resides (see section 15). 
The second position is, of course, that of Charles Darwin.  Besides adapting to an 
environment, economic agents also generate novelty that is not a mere response to adaptive 
requirements but, rather, originates in a locus independent from these.  Darwin provided a theory 
that propounds that heritable changes occur in organisms and that the adaptations to the 
environment occur ex post.  In Lamarck’s model, evolution stops when organisms are optimally 
adapted; in Darwin’s, randomness in replication is a source of novelty, propelling evolution.  The 
element of randomness is a relatively accurate approximation of the trial and error methods 
driving research and development and other explorative activities in an economy (on ‘new 
combinations’, see, for example, Schumpeter 1912, Nelson and Winter 1982 and Witt and Cordes 
2007). 
On reading the work of Thomas Malthus, Darwin became familiar with the concept of 
scarcity, which led him to his central proposition: that only the better-adapted – not just any 
adapted – organisms or species will survive.  Selection was moved from the cortical level of the 
organism to that of the natural environment.  This redefined the environment as a place in which 
scarcity and competition prevail. 
Up to this juncture, the discussion has furnished three building blocks that describe 
evolution in modern evolutionary biology.  These can be combined into a sequential order with 
distinct phases – specifying the evolutionary trajectory introduced earlier: 
 
phase 1  generation of novel genetic information 
phase 2  replication, subject to natural selection; formation of population 
phase 3  retention 
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The trajectory describes the evolution of a species.  It does not describe the evolution of an 
organism, or that of nature as a whole.  A species is defined as a population whose members 
share the same kind of genetic information.  The centrality of this concept has led Ernst Mayr to 
propose ‘population thinking’ as an overriding principle of evolutionary biology, and to contrast 
it with ‘typological thinking’, as exemplified by Carl von Linné’s taxonomy (Mayr 1982).  The key 
concept of ‘population thinking’ has also been introduced into economics by Stanley Metcalfe 
(2001), who suggests that the distinction between population and typological thinking marks the 
ontological watershed between evolutionary and mechanistic approaches in economics.  As we 
shall see in the next section, the population concept is a major – meso – building block in the 
construction of a new theoretical architecture of economics. 
 
14  Mecca III: testing the critical empirical distance 
Although life is, arguably, closer to economics than dead matter, recourse to biology still requires 
justification.  Considering the fact that most evolutionary economists would fully endorse 
Marshall’s plea that biology (rather than mechanics) be the Mecca of economics, it must seem 
somewhat surprising that little systematic discussion about the problems related to the 
vindication of Rbi ≈ Rei has been forthcoming.  There is the exceptional case of ‘Universal 
Darwinism’, though, which originates from a particular variant of the field of biology.  The 
unusual vigour with which that discussion has surfaced recently may be attributed to the fact that 
it stood in place for a broader discussion embracing the discipline of biology as a whole. 
Introduced by biologist-philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995), universal Darwinism got a 
warm reception from some economists (Hodgson 2002; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006; Aldrich et 
al. 2008; Stoelhorst 2008), but little approval from others, who criticised either the weak evidence 
of homologies, and/or the narrow scope of its questions (Witt 2004, 2008; Nelson 2006; Cordes 
2006; Vromen 2007; Levit, Hossfeld and Witt 2010) or the lack of integration of other relevant 
concepts, such as self-organisation (Buenstorf 2006; Geisendorf 2009) or epigenetics (Callebaut 
and Rasskin-Gutman 2005, Knottenbauer 2009).  It must suffice here to conclude with a general 
assessment: the discussion has furnished little in the way of systematic practical criteria to 
evaluate the question of whether, or to what extent, it is warranted to apply biological models or 
representations to a clearly defined class of economic cases. 
The difficulties with establishing systematic procedures have led some economists to 
discard a transdisciplinary perspective altogether.  Nelson and Winter, whose work has set the 
pace for much of the significant debate in the last three decades, have pointed out that they 
generally start with theoretical propositions and use any tools or language that are fit for a 
particular purpose of economic theorising.  Unlike advocates of universal Darwinism, they 
contend (Nelson and Winter 1982, 11): 
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We emphatically disavow any intention to pursue biological analogies for their own 
sake, or even for the sake of progress toward an abstract, higher-level evolutionary 
theory … 
 
Stanley Metcalfe takes the same course when he asserts (Metcalfe 2005: 392) that the various 
evolutionary concepts employed in economics 
 
have nothing inherently to do with biology and related disciplines. 
 
Indeed, why should one rule out the use of concepts, methods, analytical models or 
mathematical representations if they are useful in economics but lack empirical corroboration in 
biology? 
 
15  Economics as cultural science 
As mentioned above, economics belongs incontestably to the cultural level of the evolved natural 
hierarchy of complexity.  In order to acknowledge the complexity of economic phenomena it is 
necessary to state them in terms of the complexity of that level: Rci = Rei. 
Looking at the research that has been carried out in evolutionary economics, it is clear that 
there have been few efforts to confront the problem head-on.  The main reason for this 
reluctance may lie in the difficulties inherent in devising methods, mathematical representations 
and statistical tools that are adequate to cope with the level of complexity that the cultural level 
expounds.  In the approach to economic complexity, recourse has been had, as has been pointed 
out, to lower levels of complexity ‘as if’ they were the levels that economic phenomena displayed.  
My proposition is that, if economics is to be empirically meaningful, the starting point of any 
theoretical endeavour has to be the cultural level, not the physical level or the biological level.  
On the basis of this theoretical premise, any tool may be chosen that renders adequate service. 
While there is no broad discourse on economics as a cultural science, some groundwork has been 
forthcoming from the evolutionary camp.  Though still scanty, it may well provide a rough 
skeleton of a future theoretical agenda to set the pace for further developments.  The research 
includes works by Richard Nelson (2008), Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2010), Jason Potts (2008), 
Michael Hutter and David Throsby (2008), Viktor J. Vanberg (2004); Nils Goldschmidt and 
Bernd Remmele (2005); and Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop (2011). 
The domain of human culture comprises two major constituencies: Homo sapiens and 
cultural artefacts.  Captured in their essentials, both are carriers of cultural knowledge: Homo 
sapiens of subjective (subject-related) knowledge and cultural artefacts of objective (object-related) 
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knowledge.  This nucleic view of the cultural level yields a classification that is, in many and 
important ways, useful for economic theory construction and modelling.  It distinguishes 
between carrier and knowledge, on the one hand, and between subjects and objects, on the other. 
Cultural knowledge is used in various cultural contexts.  The specificity of and differences 
between cultural contexts are defined by the kinds of operations that are performed.  In this way, 
economics is defined as the discipline dealing with the cultural context governing economic 
operations.  Economic operations include production, consumption and transaction.  This insight 
starts to put some flesh on the bones of the earlier distinction of the knowledge level and the 
operational level, specifying the former as cultural knowledge and the latter as economic 
operations.  Cultural knowledge becomes economically relevant – that is, economic knowledge – 
when used in the context of economic operations. 
 
16  Homo sapiens oeconomicus 
Homo sapiens and cultural artefacts thus acquire particular meanings in the economic context.  
Homo sapiens – in his/her economic operations – is specified as a particular disciplinary construal: 
Homo sapiens oeconomicus (HSO) (Dopfer 2004).  Seizing upon this concept, various specifications 
may be allowed for, depending on the faculties required for particular problem solving in 
economic environments.  Essentially, HSO operates in an economic environment that embraces 
highly complex structures and is subject to continuous novelty-driven change.  HSO, accordingly, 
may be seen as a ‘complex individual’, coping with problems of structural complexity (Davis 2003, 
2008), or as ‘Homo creativus’, meeting the challenges of unpredictable qualitative change in 
economic environments (Foster 1987).  The former construal may prove particularly useful as an 
assumption for complexity models, the latter as an assumption for evolutionary models. 
Other primates create culture, but Homo sapiens – and, for that matter, HSO – excels in 
three fundamental ways.  First, man is a knowledge maker.  This faculty unfolds as a process the 
characteristics of which may be captured by a trajectory that is composed of three phases: 
 
phase 1 origination of knowledge 
phase 2 adoption of knowledge (perception, understanding, learning) 
phase 3 retention of knowledge for ongoing economic operations 
 
Second, Homo sapiens can combine different pieces of knowledge into a whole.  This faculty is 
exercised not only on the basis of reacting to environmental conditions but also on that of 
imagination independent of those external conditions.  The cognitive autonomy enables complex 
knowledge anticipation.  Third, humans can share their imagination.  Symbolic language is a 
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powerful tool for doing so.  Shared imagination, as it unfolds in the process of the generation, 
adoption and retention of knowledge, lies at the heart of economic evolution. 
 
17  Material culture in economics 
With Homo sapiens, cultural objects acquire their operational meaning when posited in an 
economic context.  Operationally specified, these represent commodities, products or goods, or 
similarly operationally specified objects. 
By way of an exemplar, consider archaeologists excavating objects at a site that furnishes a 
record of material culture.  They apply methods of stratification, which highlight the history of 
objects, and of geographic information systems (GISs) and related techniques, which place the 
findings in their spatial context.  The material account is visible, measurable and quantifiable, but 
in itself says nothing about the rationale of the organisation of the objects and about their 
operational use.  Although archaeologists agree widely on the usefulness of modern stratification 
methods, the GISs and related techniques, they are split in their views as to whether or in what 
way it should be of concern to an archaeologist to give meaning to the objects, or, instead, simply 
to leave them as material witnesses untouched by hermeneutic endeavours. 
For the present analysis, it is particularly interesting that efforts have been under way to 
construct the discipline as evolutionary archaeology employing explanatory schemes from biology, 
such as Darwinism.  These attempts have been challenged on the grounds that the explanations 
were based on wrong analogies to biology; justified as this critique may be, however, it has left in 
limbo the principal question, as to whether or how to explain the material record.  Starting from 
the cultural (rather than biological) level, an approach has been suggested that relates cultural 
artefacts to human cognition, highlighting the coevolution of objects and cognition (van der 
Leeuw and McGlade 1997).  This new kind of complexity-based evolutionary archaeology takes 
as its departure point the cultural level.  It employs principles from biology, such as Darwinian 
selection, whenever they fit a particular explanatory purpose; but it does not construct 
archaeology from biology.  Given this cultural platform, operational economic contexts may be 
identified, and the discipline of economics may be given a systematic home in archaeology.  
Complexity-based evolutionary archaeology, in turn, would seem to be the most natural home for 
evolutionary economics, which generally emphasises long-run views and empirical evidence. 
In neoclassical economics, cultural objects have no qualitative attributes.  It makes for the 
universality of the demand and supply model in its partial and general equilibrium variants that it 
abstracts from any characteristics.  Qualitative differences between commodities are translated 
into quantitative differences stated in price ratios of commodities.  Heterogeneity turns into 
homogeneity.  The neoclassical model operates not only with the assumption of a representative 
agent but also – significantly – with that of a representative commodity. 
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In contrast, evolutionary complexity economics works with both heterogeneous agents and 
heterogeneous commodities.  Admittedly, there are types of multi-agent models that work with 
heterogeneous agents but retain the assumption of homogeneous commodities, as when 
analysing the fish market of Marseilles (Kirman and Vignes 1991).  Although these models shed 
light on market equilibrium under the condition of a single kind of commodity, such as stocks, or, 
indeed, fish, they fail to provide new insights when there are many different kinds of 
commodities.  In the case of the economy as a whole (or an equivalent macro context), when, 
typically, many markets connect qualitatively in complementarities, the assumption of 
heterogeneous commodities is mandatory.  As with an excavation site in archaeology, an 
economy is composed of heterogeneous objects, and constructing the whole can be 
accomplished only by putting together the pieces with all their distinct attributes. 
 
18  Bimodal methodology 
Economic operations are anchored in knowledge.  An understanding of the nature of structure 
and the evolution of knowledge is therefore the key to an understanding of economic operations.  
A clear analytical exposition of this concept would therefore appear to represent a sensible 
starting point for the construction of an economic theory or model. 
In its archetypical form, knowledge may be seen as representing a knowledge-bit.  This 
elementary analytical unit has two essential properties.  On the one hand, it is an idea: it embodies 
semantic content.  As idea, it is time-less and space-less.  On the other hand, ideas do not reside 
in a Platonic heaven, but are always physically actualised; they have a carrier.  Ideas are actualised 
by matter and energy in time and space.  The knowledge-bit therefore typically possesses – 
ontologically – a bimodal nature (Dopfer and Potts 2008). 
Acknowledging this ontologically anchored characteristic has important implications for 
the way methodology is approached.  Ideas are not observable.  They cannot be measured with a 
metre rule but, instead, have to be interpreted in terms of their meaning – for example, as 
function or task.  The appropriate procedure for coping with qualitative attributes, such as 
product or technological characteristics, is hermeneutics.  In turn, knowledge in its physical 
actualisation is observable.  It can be measured on a metric scale and quantified.  Its methodology 
is statistics and other such quantitative measurement. 
Conceiving the elementary unit of the knowledge-bit in the entirety of its properties calls 
for recognition of both quality and quantity: for a bimodal methodology.  A monomodal 
methodology aims either at only a qualitative empirical account or at only a quantitative one.  It 
would be a mistake to associate traditional economics with quantification and distinguish it from 
evolutionary and complexity economics as an approach that deals solely with qualitative analysis.  
The difference is that the latter strand is premised on concepts such as technological 
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heterogeneity or product characteristics, conducting quantification in recognition of these 
qualitative attributes.  Traditional economics lacks any such hermeneutic guidance.  It is therefore 
good at aggregation (notwithstanding the well-known problems that accompany it), but fails 
entirely in accounting for structure.  Evolutionary economics retains qualitative attributes and, 
rather than rejecting any aggregation, it performs it in recognition of the qualitatively structured 
data. 
 
19  From micro to macro 
The knowledge approach stands in close kinship with the system approach.  A system may be 
defined as relations between component parts, and knowledge, if conceived of in a very 
generalised manner, defines both.  In this way, the economy as a knowledge-defined macro-
system is composed of interrelated knowledge-defined micro-systems. 
In simple models, the micro units are treated like physical particles (rather than systems) 
with fixed behavioural propensities.  Complex models, in turn, treat the micro units themselves as 
systems, and, as a consequence, the macro-system of the economy is composed of interrelated 
micro-systems.  There is a system hierarchy, with an upper level consisting of the total system 
and a lower level of multiple subsystems.  Coping with the intricacies of system hierarchy poses 
major challenges for complexity science and complexity economics (Lane 2006). 
The analytical problems are compounded when dealing with several levels.  Given a 
continuum of levels, the complexity in the analysis may be reduced by keeping the component 
parts simple – for instance, as in the mentioned case, by working with non-systemic micro units.  
Heading in the opposite direction, higher levels may be accounted for by specifying the micro 
unit – for instance by allowing for HSO in his/her systemic or similar characteristics.  A theory 
of the firm may thus work with either a simple or a complex model of HSO.  Viewed from the 
angle of its ‘micro–micro’ assumptions, it will be either a simple or a complex theory of the firm 
(Leibenstein 1976a, 1976b; Frantz 1986, 1997). 
 
20  Complexity meets evolution: meso 
Looking at the economy through the lens of complexity science, we see it as system.  Accordingly, 
the analytical focus here is on aspects such as hierarchy, structure, relations and 
complementariness.  In this way it is, basically, a static view.  The further question, then, is this: 
how does the macro-system move in time?  How does the economy as complex system evolve? 
We get a first clue when recalling that the micro unit is involved in the process of the 
generation, adoption and retention of knowledge.  Change occurs in the form of a micro 
trajectory actualised within the boundaries of a subsystem – for example, a firm.  Since the novel 
knowledge variant introduces a novel component into an extant structure, structural change takes 
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place.  This is an important result; and it is here, where complexity-based analysis usually ends, 
that evolutionary economics steps in. 
From an evolutionary angle, the micro units are, in their process-dynamic, not closed 
systems but open systems.  Novel knowledge variants cross the boundaries of the generating 
carrier, ‘spilling over’ into the environment.  Knowledge is encoded and decoded by carriers, and 
transmitted by communication. 
The hallmark of the bimodality assumption is that a single knowledge-bit can be actualised 
many times.  It can be actualised not just by a single carrier but by many carriers; for instance, a 
technology can be adopted by many firms.  A single actualisation of a knowledge-bit may be 
possible, but it would be a special case, as opposed to the general case of many actualisations.  
Complexity economics, reduced to its essentials, assumes a special case to be the general one.  
Introducing the evolutionary perspective, the analytical unit for the construction of macro is not 
a single knowledge-bit (a single idea, a single actualisation) but, rather, a single idea and many 
carriers actualising it.  The analytical unit is one knowledge-bit and many actualisations.  
Evolutionary complexity expounds as both ‘one-ness’ and ‘many-ness’. 
This leads us to a theoretical architecture of economics in which the received micro–macro 
dichotomy collapses.  ‘Micro’ is a member of a population, and it is not the micro unit but, rather, 
a population of them that is the component part of ‘macro’.  One may circumvent the population 
by heading directly from micro to macro, but this represents a valid procedure only if one is 
dealing with the uniform single-actualisation case or if the aim is to ignore the aspects of process 
altogether. 
As it is neither micro nor macro, there is a gap in our terminology.  Recognising the 
intermediate nature of this analytical unit, we may call it, without challenging our vocabulary 
excessively, ‘meso’.  The upshot of the meso unit is the duality of its defining characteristics: it is 
a structure component and a process component.  It is a structure component in that it connects 
as single knowledge-content or idea with others (section 13), and a process component in that it 
expounds the logic of its physical actualisation in time and space (section 14). 
 
21  Architecture: micro–meso–macro 
The architecture of an evolutionary complexity-based economics is starting to take shape.  Its 
constituent domains are these: 
 
micro 
meso 
macro 
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The major building block from which macro is constructed is meso.  The construction work can 
start by specifying what the two constituencies of knowledge consist of: knowledge content and 
actualisation process.  Constructing macro from knowledge content, we get structure in its 
semantic characteristics, as ideas; let us call it the ‘deep’ macro structure.  Constructing macro 
from actualisation processes, we obtain an observable structure as it unfolds along the trajectories 
of the generation, adoption and retention of knowledge; we may call this the ‘surface’ macro 
structure. 
 
22  Investigating structural complexity 
Knowledge content may come in two guises: as a single knowledge-bit or as a structured 
knowledge composite actualised in a carrier.  Depending on which one we choose as our 
assumption, we will get quite different models. 
On the one hand, a meso model may be constructed by turning to the composite 
knowledge actualised in a carrier – for example, a firm.  A meso population is then composed of 
many carriers, such as firms.  The macro is construed analogously, from a composite of carrier-
defined meso units.  It represents the visible surface structure of macro.  Most current strands, 
such as multi-agent models and industrial sector dynamic models, operate on the basis of carriers 
or agents.  In models of the former type the theoretical specification of meso does not play an 
essential role (Tefsatsion 2005), but it is a constituent aspect in the latter (Pyka, Gilbert and 
Ahrweiler 2006; Pyka and Fagiolo 2007; Castellacci 2009). 
On the other hand, meso may be viewed as being composed of single knowledge-bits, such 
as a technology.  Unlike in the preceding case, the meso population is now not composed of 
carriers but, rather, of actualisations of a single knowledge-bit.  In this way, for instance, a single 
technology has a population of actualisations.  Models that operate upon single knowledge-bits, 
rather than carriers, include learning, selective adoption and path-dependent models (as 
addressed in the following section). 
Employing knowledge-bits as the building block, macro emerges as a deep knowledge 
structure or division of knowledge.  The methodological cornerstone of this analysis is mereology.  
Though not conducted under this label, there is a body of literature (scanty as it is) that explicitly 
recognises its theoretical significance (Schnabl 2000; Langlois 2002; Helmstädter 2003; Chen 
2005; Reinstaller 2007; Antonelli 2008; Neffke and Henning 2009).  By way of an example, 
producing a car requires the assembly of various components that stand in complementariness to 
each other.  In contrast, a carrier-based composite approach allows us only to analyse 
interdependences stated in terms of inputs and outputs – for instance, as a Leontief inverse 
matrix.  Neither the input mix nor the output end result provides any information as to how the 
component parts are combined.  As can be seen, therefore, the conventional composite approach 
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fails to serve as an appropriate basis for depicting the ‘deep’ structure of knowledge in an 
economy. 
Micro knowledge-bits or carriers may be assembled into a subsystem (Hayden 2008); or, 
similarly, a game-theoretic social context may be singled out for partial analysis (Elsner 2010).  In 
this way, a further level (besides micro and macro) in the continuum of levels of the system 
hierarchy may be introduced.  Analogously, a level of sub-aggregates in a continuum marked by 
micro (no aggregation) and macro (total aggregation) may be allowed for.  Assuming a single 
(systemic, aggregation) level, it will show up as an intermediate level, and the label ‘meso’ may be 
assigned to it.  Introducing further levels in the continuum, a sequence of meso levels will result – 
say, meso 1, meso 2, meso 3, and so on.  This is not a satisfactory analytical result. 
Within the present framework, for an analytical unit to qualify as meso, two conditions 
have to be met.  On the one hand, the construal must be identified as a component part of a 
structure.  It is inessential that the structure component itself expounds structural features 
(though this assumption is consistent with the concept).  On the other hand, the structure 
component must be stated in terms of a process dealing with the generation, selective adoption 
and retention of knowledge.  Although in-depth system analysis, game theory and differentiated 
aggregation procedures are themselves useful, they fail to provide essential cues for a theoretical 
construction of an evolving macro structure unless they explicate its role as structure component 
and, as is shown subsequently, as process component. 
 
23  The evolutionary core 
While a systemic account focuses on the synchronic aspects of an economy, evolutionary analysis 
aims at an enquiry into its diachronic aspects.  Dealing in the following with the latter, meso – as 
building block for macro – needs to be identified as a process component.  Until this juncture, 
change has been viewed as occurring within micro, for example as a firm, representing its 
dynamic as a micro trajectory.  This concept may serve as a blueprint for dealing with the meso 
dynamic – with the only, albeit essential, difference relating to adoption.  In the first phase, the 
two concepts match, but, in the second phase (dealing with the adoption of knowledge), the 
distinction is between microscopic and macroscopic – or ‘mesoscopic’ – adoption.  Again, the 
trajectory may be construed by employing either a single carrier or a single knowledge-bit 
actualised in distinct populations. 
As a master model, the meso trajectory looks as follows: 
 
1 origination of new knowledge 
2 macroscopic adoption of new knowledge 
3 retention of new knowledge 
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An enormous amount of work has been done on the various aspects of the trajectory dynamic.  
In more recent work, a trend may be observed away from the analysis of ‘isolated trajectories’ 
towards looking at ‘embedded trajectories’, which work out their dynamic in a structured or 
network environment (Potts 2000). 
With regard to the first phase, novelty generation, although this is usually considered to be 
the engine of economic growth, it is still for the most part an under-researched topic (Encinar 
and Muñoz 2006; Witt 2009; Grebel 2009; Endres and Woods 2010).  An intriguing aspect 
concerns the complex dynamic relationship between structural complementariness and the 
generation of novelty, as captured by the concept of ‘generative relationship’ (Lane and Maxfield 
2005; Lane et al. 2009; Antonelli 2010), innovation systems, dominant designs and development 
blocs effective in the context of an experimentally organised economy (Lundvall and Borrás 
2005; Murmann and Frenken 2006; Eliasson 2010; Johansson 2010) and institutionally and 
spatially structured micro–meso–macro innovation clusters (Werker and Athreye 2004; Brette 
and Mehier 2008; Uyarra 2010). 
There is a vast literature related to the second phase, the diffusion and macroscopic 
adoption of knowledge.  The work embraces broadly conceived product diffusion and cross-
sectoral models (Peneder 2003; Buenstorff and Klepper 2009), selection models (Knudsen 2002; 
van den Bergh and Gowdy 2009), path dependence and network life cycle models (Pyka 2000; 
David 2005; Martin and Sunley 2006; Arthur 2009) and experiment-based diffusion, learning and 
networking models (Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo 2005; Tyran and Sausgruber 2005).  These 
models address different aspects of the meso dynamic, but they all share the feature of 
conceiving it in a structured environment or network. 
The third phase embraces the fields of habits, skills and routines and, in general, the field 
of institutions.  The literature on these topics has expanded ever since the publication of Nelson 
and Winter’s seminal 1982 contribution (Lazaric and Raybaut 2005; Parra 2005; Becker 2008).  
Further developments may be expected along the line of the original strands of American 
institutionalism – a theoretical potential that is far from being exhausted (Nelson and Nelson 
2002; Hodgson 2007; Nelson 2008). 
 
24  Looking to the future 
Schumpeter remarked a hundred years ago that economic statics was already well developed and 
that what was therefore needed was the development of an economic dynamics.  Developments 
in the discipline took a different course, however.  The theoretical efforts of the last hundred 
years or so have resulted in a monumental edifice of economic statics, lacking anything 
comparable on the side of economic dynamics.  The exceptions were (besides Schumpeter’s own 
 #1102 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
contribution) the various post-war economic growth theories.  While these theories, particularly 
in their vintage as endogenous growth theories and post-Keynesian models, have furnished 
important insights, they are built on premises that make it difficult to address economic growth 
as an endogenously self-generating, self-adapting and continuously self-restructuring process. 
A theory conducive to coping with this core problem requires the introduction of a vehicle 
that allows us to deal with both process and structure.  Since structure and process are not 
isolated but, rather, two sides of a single phenomenon, the meso vehicle would seem to render a 
useful service in tackling this problem.  Although the construction of macro along these lines is 
still in its infancy, interesting work has already been forthcoming in terms of addressing 
economic growth as a self-generating process in its causal nexus with a continuous restructuring 
of the economy (Saviotti and Pyka 2004, 2008; Metcalfe, Foster and Ramlogan 2005; Silverberg 
and Verspagen 2005a; Malerba 2006; Cantner and Krüger 2008; Foster 2011). 
Further groundwork will be needed to secure the sustainability of this theoretical course.  
This will include, on the one hand, further theoretical work on the basic relationship between the 
levels of micro, meso and macro, as well as on taxonomies relating to the various kinds of 
knowledge and of carriers.  Work on the micro–meso–macro architecture may be advanced in 
various ways, as, for instance, by adopting a unified rule approach that advances taxonomy and 
the theoretical exposition on the basis of the concept of (complex and evolving) generic rules 
(Dopfer, Foster and Potts 2004; Dopfer 2005; Dopfer and Potts 2008).  Further groundwork is 
needed, on the other hand, concerning the methods for empirical research.  Enquiring into 
complex evolving systems requires both quantification and hermeneutic methods.  These 
methods apply to empirical data that at any one time have a structure, calling for a Linnéan type 
of taxonomy, and that over time are continuously changing, calling for a Darwinian type of 
taxonomy.  Cladistic and related taxonomies have emerged as a way of reconciling the demands 
of structural complexity and evolution when charting empirical data (Cantner and Pyka 2001; 
Allen 2005; Andersen 2003).  Scientific advances will be made in the future in this new camp – as 
they will, arguably, in much of science – along a coevolutionary path, with theory, method and 
empirical work receiving their appropriate share of the recognition. 
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